We investigate how settlement banks in CHAPS, the United Kingdom's large-value payment system, react to outages experienced by counterparties. If banks do not su¢ ciently monitor their outgoing payments, operational shocks can impact the entire payment system: the stricken bank absorbs liquidity. We …rst build a game-theoretic model in which a bank's decision to make payments depends on whether another bank experiences operational problems, and on the time of day at which the outage occurs. We then investigate these reactions empirically using a non-parametric method. Our theory predicts that banks stop paying to a stricken bank early in the day, when they are uncertain about the payment instructions they might have to execute. When this uncertainty has been resolved (later in the day), healthy banks make payments even to stricken banks. Both predictions are supported by the data. We show that this behaviour e¤ectively contains the disruption caused by the operational outage: payment ‡ows between healthy banks remain virtually uninterrupted.
Introduction
Payment and settlement systems are vital to the smooth functioning of any advanced economy. They are used to settle trades in foreign exchange, equities, bonds and money market instruments. Consumers rely on them to make house purchases, receive salaries and bene…ts, and pay for goods and services. We investigate how settlement banks in CHAPS, the United Kingdom's large-value payment system, react to outages experienced by another CHAPS settlement bank. 1 In RTGS systems like CHAPS, there is a risk that settlement banks continue to make payments to a bank that is able to receive but unable to make payments. The bank experiencing operational problems thereby involuntarily absorbs liquidity: it becomes a 'liquidity sink'. This liquidity is not available any more to execute payments between other, healthy settlement banks. Thus, if banks do not su¢ ciently monitor their outgoing payments, operational risk at one bank is a source of systemic risk.
We …rst build a game-theoretic model in which a bank's decision to make payments depends on whether another bank experiences operational problems, and on the time of the day at which the problems arise. In the empirical part, we estimate these reactions to an operational outage using data from CHAPS. Our theory predicts that banks stop paying to a stricken bank early in the day, when they are still uncertain about their payment ‡ows. When this uncertainty has been resolved, healthy banks make payments even to stricken banks. Both results are supported by our empirical evidence. We show that this behaviour prevents spill-overs of the operational problem to healthy banks: payment values between healthy banks remain una¤ected.
We hope to contribute to the existing literature in two respects. First, to our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to analyse how banks react to operational outages changes during the day. Second, we apply a more rigorous econometric approach than previous studies to analyse the frequency with which payments are made, following Engle and Russel (1998) . The method we employ should be well suited to the analysis of high-frequency, irregularly spaced transaction level data. In particular, we do not have to aggregate data in arbitrary intervals. We can rely on non-parametric methods that provide a thorough picture of changes in payment ‡ows before, during and after outages.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of related literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model; section 4 the empirical results. Section 5 concludes
Related literature
Game-theoretic models of behaviour in large-value payment systems (such as CHAPS) predict that the timing of payments in real-time gross settlement systems is the result of banks trading o¤ delay costs and liquidity costs. The argument runs as follows. Intraday liquidity can be drawn from two sources: (1) from the central bank (the settlement agent in CHAPS) against collateral; (2) from incoming payments. In the …rst case, the cost of liquidity is the opportunity cost of having to hold (and transfer) securities eligible as collateral. In the second case, banks may not receive su¢ cient payments in time to execute their payment instructions promptly; delay, however, could be expensive when contractual obligations or market practice are violated. As banks seek to minimize the cost associated with sending payments, their choice determines the distribution of payments throughout the day.
The starting point of our theoretical model is Bech and Garratt (2003) . In their model, high liquidity costs encourage banks to delay payments, awaiting the receipt of incoming payments to fund their out ‡ows. We retain their assumption that there are two banks that pay each other but increase the number of periods in which settlement banks can make payments to each other to three (morning, afternoon, and evening) to be able to describe the incentive to delay payments in the morning and the afternoon. To be able to analyse why they react di¤erently to shocks in the morning and the afternoon, we further extend their analysis: we allow operational shocks to occur in each period; that banks do not know all their payment instructions at the beginning of the day; and we distinguish two types of payment instructions, 'normal'and 'urgent'ones. Angelini (1998) considers the behavior of banks with both liquidity and delay costs in a RTGS system. In a model with two banks, who regard their incoming payments as exogenous, he shows that banks will delay payments somewhat, balancing delay costs and the costs of a daylight overdraft. Mills and Nesmith (2008) and Kahn et al (2003) consider the e¤ect of settlement risks 2 on timing decisions. They illustrate another rationale for delays: uncertainty about whether the other participants might either default or delay can prompt the participants to delay their payments to obtain a better forecast of the cost of funding their own out ‡ows. Mills and Nesmith (2008) 's model is closely related but di¤ers in many details. First, their assumptions about the costs of obtaining intraday credit from the central bank are appropriate to a priced intraday credit regime but not to systems in which the central bank provides collateralised intraday credit for free, such as CHAPS. As our data refers to CHAPS, we opted for the latter speci…cation, and chose to explicitly model banks'collateral postings. Second, their model only contains one operational shock; given that our aim is to see how a bank's response depends on the time at which the shock occurs, we need at least two shocks. (One in the morning, the other in the afternoon -the evening shock is needed to provide banks with an incentive to pay in the afternoon rather than wait for the evening.)
In contrast to Mills and Nesmith (2008) , we also need two payment instructions, which di¤er in their urgency, to explain why a stricken bank's response di¤ers. Willison (2005) and Martin and McAndrews (2008) also investigate the role that urgent payments play for banks' decision-making behaviour. Their focus is, however, on a di¤erent question (how liquiditysaving mechanisms a¤ect settlement); and their models have only two periods, which makes them unsuitable for our task.
A few, so far mostly descriptive empirical papers analyse payments data in normal and stressed environments. McAndrews 
Model
The model covers payments behaviour on a single day. Two banks decide at the start of the day how much liquidity to borrow from the central bank. In the subsequent periods, they decide whether to delay the execution of their payment instruction(s). Whether delay is attractive depends on how much liquidity each bank has available, on its opponent's strategy, and on whether operational shocks have hit one or both banks. The following section formalises the setup. We then provide some intuition for the trade-o¤s that banks face. Section 3.3 guides the reader through our results. The proofs are discussed in the appendix.
Setup
Two banks i = 1; 2 interact in four periods t = 1; 2; 3; 4. In the …rst, they simultaneously decide on their collateral postings C i 2 f0; 1; 2g at cost C i and receive the instruction to execute a normal payment of value 1 to their opponent. Banks incur the one-o¤ fee C i independently of how long they need the liquidity. 4 Collateral posting decisions remain private information. Three periods in which payments can be made follow. In each period, each bank can be hit by an operational shock s t i 2 f0; 1g, where t 2 fM; A; Eg indexes the periods, with probability " i . If s t i = 1, the bank is unable to make payments in this period, but able to receive them. 5 Shocks are publicly observable 6 and independently distributed across periods and banks. If s t i = 0, bank i can execute all payment instructions it has received if it has su¢ cient liquidity at the beginning of this period. That is, there is no possibility to net payments within a period. As in Bech and Garrat (2003) , this assumption is made to re ‡ect the key characteristic of any real-time gross settlement systems, that is, that payments cannot be netted.
At the start of the day, each bank obtains one payment instruction of value 1. In the second period, the afternoon, each bank may obtain an additional instruction of value 1 with probability v i . In contrast to the morning instruction, this one is urgent, and delay to the evening costs d > . In the third period, the evening, no further instructions arrive. In the evening, each bank can attempt to raise additional liquidity at cost to settle any outstanding instructions (unless it is hit by an operational shock). This attempt, however, fails with some probability. (Transferring collateral into the payment system can take several hours when it is not held in the same securities settlement system. Uncollateralised interbank overnight loans may not be granted.) For simplicity, we set this probability to 1=2. Banks incur a cost of f n > (for normal instructions) and f u > ; d (for urgent instructions) for any outstanding payment instruction that is not executed at all. 7 Each bank is trying to minimise the total costs arising from posting collateral and delaying / failing to execute payment instructions. We neglect any costs of having to re…nance a negative balance overnight, and bene…ts from lending out a surplus, assuming that these costs are small compared to those of technical default.
Trade-o¤s and intuition for main results.
At the start of the day, each bank has to decide how much liquidity it borrows from the central bank to settle its payments. We endogenise this decision; however, to understand the main trade-o¤s, it is useful to assume that this decision has been made, and investigate the bank's payment behaviour in the morning, the afternoon, and the evening.
Suppose …rst that the bank has posted two units of collateral in the morning. Then it 5 Notice that the receipt of payments is always possible unless the central bank's payment system breaks down. We do not consider this type of operational outage. Instead, we look at bank-speci…c shocks. 6 In CHAPS, settlement banks are required to report operational problems within 15 [CHECK] minutes of the start of the outage. 7 By convention, f u includes d: That is, if an urgent payment instruction is not executed, the cost is f u , not f u + d.
has no reason to delay: the expense for the collateral has been incurred, and liquidity su¢ ces to make both payments. The bank might as well use it to make the payments to avoid the risk that it will not be able to do so in a later period, given that its systems may be hit by an operational shock. Thus, the risk of operational shocks, together with the cost of technical default f n and f u , means that it is, in expectation, costly to delay even normal payment instructions, and adds to the delay cost of the urgent payment instruction (d). Now suppose that the bank decided to post one unit of collateral. The incentive to execute payment instructions quickly remains. But if it executes the normal payment instruction in the morning, it may not have any liquidity left to execute the urgent payment instruction immediately in the afternoon. Hence, if the arrival of the urgent payment instruction in the afternoon is su¢ ciently likely (v i large), or its cost of delay high (d large) relative to the risk of operational failure " i , then the bank will prefer to save the liquidity for the afternoon if it does not anticipate to receive a payment from its opponent in the morning. If, in contrast, it expects to receive such a payment in the morning, it can use this liquidity in the afternoon to execute the urgent payment instruction. In this case, there is no bene…t from delaying the normal payment.
Thus, optimal payments behaviour when the bank posts one unit of liquidity depends on its opponent's behaviour. Of most interest is the case in which both banks post one unit of collateral, and in which the delay cost d exceeds a threshold d L;i . Then there may be two equilibria: one in which no bank pays in the morning, and one in which both pay. In either case, both banks have su¢ cient liquidity to execute an urgent payment instruction in the afternoon. Payo¤s are lower in the …rst equilibrium because any delay increases the risk that payments may not be executed at all because of operational shocks.
If the bank decides to post no collateral, it fully relies on incoming liquidity to make its payments, and / or on a successful attempt to raise liquidity in the evening. Clearly, this is only optimal when costs of liquidity are very high, operational shocks unlikely, the delay of urgent instructions inexpensive, and the costs of failure to execute payments low.
It is interesting to note that if the cost of delaying the urgent payment is high (d > d L;i ), then the decision between posting one or two units of collateral does not depend on d. This is because independently of opponent play, the bank will always prefer to ensure that it has su¢ cient collateral available to execute the urgent instruction immediately. For su¢ ciently high costs of collateral , the bank will only post one unit. In contrast, the decision between posting zero or one, and between posting zero or two units of collateral depends on d. For su¢ ciently high delay costs d, posting one or two units is preferred. Taken together, these features imply that for su¢ ciently high delay costs, and high costs of collateral, both banks post one unit of collateral in all equilibria.
The following section presents the setup and the main result more formally. Readers less interested in the game-theoretic modelling are invited to jump straight to the empirical results in section 4.
Equilibrium
The game is a …nite two-player game. We are only looking for pure-strategy equilibria. The solution is via backwards induction. This section …rst considers equilibrium play starting from the afternoon period, and then moves backwards to the morning period, and the collateral posting decision. Let p t n;i 2 f0; 1g be the number of normal payment instructions player i executes in period t, and correspondingly p t u;i 2 f0; 1g for the urgent payment instructions. p t i = p t n;i + p t u;i is the total number of payment instructions player i executes in t. Let l t i denote the available liquidity at the beginning of period t, that is, before any period-t payments are made or received. i 2 f0; 1g denotes whether player i receives an urgent payment instruction. The intra-period timing is as follows for both players i 2 f1; 2g: i receives a payment instruction (not in period E); i learns whether he and / or his opponent is hit by an operational shock lasting for the entire period; (in period E only: i decides whether to attempt to raise additional liquidity); if i is healthy, he decides how many payment instructions to submit, subject to having su¢ cient liquidity available; i's cash account is debited with outgoing payments; i's cash account is credited with incoming payments.
Depending on the parameter values, di¤erent equilibria exist. Indeed, for a given set of parameter values, there may be multiple equilibria. We focus here on a speci…c set of parameter values:
1. The opportunity costs a settlement bank incurs when investing in (low-yielding) collateral and submitting it to the central bank are su¢ ciently high to discourage the settlement bank to post enough liquidity that would make it independent of any incoming payments with certainty. Formally must exceed for both players i a threshold L;i (C j ) whose value depends on the collateral C j that the opponent j posts in the …rst period of the game. L;i (C j ) is de…ned in lemma 4 in the appendix.
2. The delay costs of the urgent transaction are assumed to be su¢ ciently high to discourage the bank from not posting any liquidity at all. Formally d must exceed a threshold d L;i (C j ) for both players i whose value depends again on C j . d L;i (C j ) is de…ned in de…nition 1 at the start of the appendix.
For these ranges of and d, there exist two equilibria, and players …nd it optimal to post exactly one unit of collateral at the beginning of the day in both of them. Equilibrium behaviour in the afternoon and the evening is identical in both equilibria: In the afternoon, all available liquidity is used to execute outstanding payment instructions unless the player is hit by an operational shock. Normal instructions are only executed after urgent instructions have been executed. In the evening, all remaining instructions are executed subject to available liquidity unless the player is hit by an operational shock. If liquidity is insu¢ cient, and s E i = 0, an attempt is made to raise additional liquidity.
But equilibria di¤er in their payments behaviour in the morning. In the …rst equilibrium, E1, neither bank makes a payment in the morning. In the second equilibrium, E2, banks pay each other in the morning unless they, or their opponent, su¤er from an operational problem. Behaviour in E2 ensures that whether or not a bank or its opponent experiences an operational outage, it has su¢ cient liquidity available at the start of the second period to execute the urgent payment instruction immediately. Proposition 1 formally states the equilibrium.
, then there exist two symmetric equilibria. In both these equilibria, C 1 = C 2 = 1, payments in the afternoon and the evening are given by
The proof is in the appendix. We do not investigate in this paper how banks could coordinate on equilibrium E2. 8 In CHAPS, there are additional incentives to coordinate on E2: Settlement banks are subject to throughput targets, requiring each settlement bank to submit on average 50% of the value of all payments by noon. 9 A committee consisting of the CHAPS settlement banks and the Bank of England in its role as overseer of payment systems monitors how well these targets are met. Empirically, settlement banks indeed transmit about half of their payments (in terms of value) in the morning. E2 predicts exactly that. If there is an operational shock, banks tend to stop sending to the stricken bank in the morning (see the estimation results in the following section), while they react much less to such a shock in the afternoon. Again, this is in line with E2's predictions.
Equilibrium E2 is e¢ cient among symmetric equilibria: given that each bank posts one unit of liquidity, payments are settled as early as possible, minimising expected costs. The underlying reason is that delay costs are higher than the cost of liquidity. Admittedly, this basic prediction has already been made in Bech and Garrat (2003) . The extensions made in our model allow us to derive a more precise prediction: that even when delay costs are high, banks will stop sending payments to a stricken bank in the morning, but not in the afternoon.
A bank stops sending payments to a stricken bank when it is unsure whether it has su¢ cient liquidity available to execute all remaining payments. This is, in principle, good news for systemic risk. Whether it is su¢ cient to contain the e¤ects of the shock is an empirical question. Our empirical results, presented in the following section, show that indeed, healthy banks'payment behaviour to a stricken bank is su¢ cient to leave payment values exchanged between healthy banks una¤ected by the stricken bank's operational shock.
Estimation
This part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides a brief description of the UK large-value payment system; section 4.2 describes the data; in section 4.3, we analyse the impact of an operational failure on payment ‡ows to stricken banks. 8 There are a few theoretical arguments against the choice of a Pareto-dominated equilibrium such as E1: That the dominant equilibrium should be the focal point; or that players 'agree'to play it in a pre-play round of communication.
9 See section 4.1 for more on CHAPS.
A Description of CHAPS Sterling
CHAPS is the United Kingdom's high-value payment system, providing real-time gross settlement (RTGS) of credit transfers. CHAPS started operating in 1984 as a nationwide, electronic inter-bank system for sending irrevocable, guaranteed and unconditional sterling credit transfers from one settlement member to another for same-day value. In April 1996, it was developed into an RTGS system. It now handles nearly all large-value same-day sterling payments between banks, other than those relating speci…cally to the settlement of securities transactions.
The system, which operates on business days between 06:00 and 16:00, has …fteen banks as direct members. In 2006 average daily volumes and values amounted to 131,000 payments and £ 231bn. Payment ‡ows are highly concentrated. The 5 biggest banks account for over 80 per cent of both volume and value. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of England (BoE) and CHAPSco sets out the respective roles and responsibilities of the BoE, CHAPSCo and the members in the operation of the CHAPS services. The BoE operational responsibilities include amongst others: ensure that settlement facilities are available for 99.95% of the operating day on average over the course of the month; settle transactions within 30 seconds; process a peak day's volumes within 4 hours; inform CHAPSCo of operational problems within 5 minutes of their identi…cation; provide at least one month's notice of planned technical changes that may a¤ect the system functioning. Members are required to inform CHAPS (and subsequently other members) of operational problems within 15 minutes of their identi…cation. Further, to improve the e¢ ciency of liquidity usage by preventing any one institution from hoarding liquidity, members are required to comply with the following guidelines, measured over a calendar month. An average of 50% of value should be throughput by 12:00 and 75% by 14:30. The other role of the BoE is to supply collateralized intraday liquidity to CHAPS members. Collateralised intraday credit and incoming payments are the main sources of liquidity in CHAPS sterling; in addition, settlement banks can also use their reserve account balance to …nance payment out ‡ows.
Data
The focus is on the payment activity of the …ve major banks which represents 80 per cent of the activity in value. The dataset covers 8 days in 2007 when at least one of these banks was unable to send any payment during a certain time interval. Detailed information on the timing of outages and the identity of stricken banks was provided by APACS (the UK trade association for payments). Table 1 reports for each outage, the date, start time and end time. For con…dentiality reasons the identity of the bank experiencing the outage is not given. Note that the eight outages di¤er along several dimensions: start time, length and duration. This will allow to let outage impacts to vary along these dimensions and make this exercise more informative.
A second source of information is the CHAPS database that contains individual transaction data. For each payment one observes the transaction date and time, the payment value, the payer and payee.
The time between transactions is the reciprocal of the transaction rate, which is itself a proxy for volume. We are, however, interested in payment values, as funding and delay costs are presumably proportional to the value of a payment. (Our theoretical model abstracted from the di¤erence between volume and value for simplicity.) Following Gourieroux et al (1998) value-weighted payments durations are calculated as follows. Assume that we observe on every day a sequence of payments, which are indexed by n; n = 1; :::::; N m and the associated payment times n (m) : The duration between the successive ticks n 1 and n is simply the time that expires between two payment times,
The weighted durations instead represent the time required by a bank to make a …xed value of payments. Let n (m) denote the value paid at time d n (m) : By summing up values of individual payments for a count of N t (m) payments, the cumulated payments value is obtained
i.e. the volume paid on day m by t: The value duration is de…ned
as the time necessary to observe an increment of cumulated value. is set to 1 billion pound 10 .
Before durations are calculated the values of simultaneous payments are summed (by bank) and then outgoing and incoming payment values at each point in time are matched by payer. Overnight durations are ignored. After deleting these observations there are 466348 durations (observations). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. For outgoing durations the average time between successive events is 1355.7 seconds (or about 23 minutes). The minimum duration is 1 second and the maximum duration 12259 seconds (or about 3 hours 40 minutes). Figure 1 is a plot of the density for the waiting times showing in more details the events distribution. Durations above 1 hour occur rarely. 11 The x-axis shows the time of the day. The y-axis shows the estimated time it takes for a bank to receive additional payments worth £ 1bn. For example, at 8:30 (corresponding to 30,000 seconds after the start of the day), a bank expects to receive an additional £ 1bn within the next 30 minutes (corresponding to 1,800 seconds). There is a rapid increase in activity immediately after the opening and a gradual increase thereafter (with two small peaks at the throughput deadlines 12:00 (43,000 seconds) and 14:30 (52,000 seconds).
Unlike other …nancial data (e.g. transaction data), long durations, and likewise short durations, do not occur in clusters. The absence of duration clustering is also visible in the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial ACF plotted in Figure 3 . Indeed, autocorrelation shows up in a slowly decreasing autocorrelation function that starts at a high value and the partial autocorrelations are small in magnitude and not signi…cant statistically.
The Impact of Outages on Payment Flows to Stricken Banks
In this section, we estimate average di¤erences in payment ‡ows to stricken banks between days when they experience an outage and days when they do not experience any outage. In particular, we estimate reactions of the value-weighted duration of incoming payments: that is, the reaction of the time it takes the stricken bank to receive a certain amount of liquidity from the other banks. The higher the value-weighted duration, the less liquidity the bank receives. We also analyse how banks'reaction changed in the second half of 2007, which we associate with times of greater uncertainty in the market.
Empirical Speci…cations
Assume a bank experienced an outage started at time T s and ended at time T e on day d: Given the absence of duration clustering in our data we propose the following (non-dynamic) semi-parametric speci…cation is proposed to assess changes in the intensity of a bank's incoming payment ‡ow before, during and after outages it experienced. For stock market data researchers have observed a non-linearity in durations due the sharp decline in trading at lunch time. Payments activity in Chaps is not interrupted so that this non-linearity does not show up in our data.
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is an unspeci…ed function to be estimated that controls for time-speci…c e¤ects, and t i is the time at which duration i starts. Hence, this speci…cation exploits variations within bank and across days. The speci…cation allows us to assess the impact of the average outage.
The next speci…cation is used to analyse intra-outage dynamics
where N id = t i T s is the number of seconds elapsed since an outage started for intra-outage transactions (i.e. if t i < T e ) and zero otherwise. Hence, f 2 (N id ) measures how the incoming duration to the stricken bank depends on the 'age'of the outage, that is, the time that has expired since the outage started. f 3 (t i ) is again included to control for time-of-the-day e¤ects.
Last, the e¤ect of outages is allowed to vary depending on the time of the day outages start
where OdM orning (OdAf ternoon) is a dummy that takes value one if bank b experienced an outage at time t i and t i is a pre-12 pm (post 12pm) time.
The control days are taken as days when no bank experiences an outage. We take the closest previous working day as a control day for an outage day: in ‡ows to a bank on a day and hours when it experiences an outage is compared to its in ‡ow at the same hours on the closest previous working day when no bank experiences an outage. Table 3 column (1) reports the results of estimating equation (4) . The coe¢ cient on the interaction term Outage bd during is statistically signi…cant and suggests that the time it takes for a stricken bank to receive an additional billion pound of customer payments from other banks rises by about 60 per cent (0.596*100) during an outage. Figure 4 plots the intra-outage dynamic, that is, function f 2 in equation (5),
Results
The duration rises by up to 100% during an average outage. This peak is reached about 2500 seconds (or 40 minutes) after the outage starts and declines slightly thereafter to stabilize at 60% until the outage ends. This non-linearity may be explained by the trade-o¤ banks face between paying immediately and incurring a liquidity cost (e.g. by having to raise additional liquidity in the interbank market) and delay costs. But the non-linearity is also to some extent driven by the fact that our duration measure is a forward measure of activity intensity. In other words, the increase in activity observed intra-outage is partly driven by the post-outage recovery. Indeed, recall the duration at transaction i is the time it takes from transaction i for a bank to cumulate a billion in payments activity. These results are qualitatively similar when we consider in isolation the longest outage (not reported). Table 3 column (2) reports an estimation of equation (6) . The coe¢ cients on OdM orning i and OdAf ternoon i are both statistically signi…cant at the 1 per cent con…dence level: The interpretation of the coe¢ cient on OdM orning i is that the duration of payment in ‡ows to a stricken bank rises by about 150% (1.516*100) during outages occurring before 12 pm. It rises by only 20% (0.206*100) during outages occurring in the afternoon. This result was to be expected as banks have more leeway to delay payments early in the day than closer to the end of the trading day. The di¤erence between morning and afternoon outages e¤ects falls when we exclude the two longest and two shortest outages (this makes morning and afternoon outages more comparable, column 3), but the increase in the duration is still about twice as large in the morning. (The di¤erence remains statistically signi…cant). We then show that our results are robust to the inclusion of outages occurring on particular calendar days. Table 4 column (1) reports estimates of day of week e¤ects on the logarithm of the CHAPS daily payment activity measured in billion pounds. The results indicate that di¤erences in payments activity across days of the week are not large enough to account for the estimated 60% decline in payments sent to stricken banks during operational outages. The results are robust to adding additional calendar e¤ects (column 2). However, one calendar e¤ect that appears su¢ ciently large is a 57% decline in activity on US holidays. Given that two outages in our data have occurred on a US holiday (September 3rd and October 8th) we test the robustness of our estimates to excluding theses days and we also exclude a third outage that occurred during the second half of 2007 (September 4th). The result is reported in Table 3 column (4). The conclusions continue to hold in the reduced sample: the coe¢ cient on OdM orning i is 1.242 and the coe¢ cient on OdAf ternoon i 0.163. Column (5) compares the e¤ect of the shortest two outages that occurred during the credit crunch (outages 7 and 8) to the two shortest outages pre-credit crunch (outages 2 and 3). The result indicates that during outages shorter than 20 minutes banks hoard payments during the liquidity crunch (post August 9th 2007) with durations 50% longer (0.516*100) but not in tranquil times. However this result as to be taken with caution because two of the outages that occurred during the crisis are US holidays when payment activity is about 60% lower than other days.
Finally, column (6) reports an estimate of the e¤ect of outages on payment activity between healthy banks. In order to derive this result incoming durations of healthy banks were calculated excluding payments from and to a stricken bank. The result indicates that outages do not produce negative externalities. The coe¢ cient on Outage bd during is small (0.057) and not signi…cant statistically at conventional levels, implying that activity among healthy banks is unaltered during an outage.
Conclusion
The evidence in this paper indicates that banks react to large operational outages by ceasing to make payments to stricken banks. In line with the prediction of our model, the reaction to outages is stronger in the morning than to those in the afternoon. The peak of the reduction of ‡ows to the stricken bank occurs no later than one hour into the outage. Presumably delay costs become too large afterwards, encouraging banks to make some payments to the stricken bank. The fact that banks initially stop making payments to stricken banks reduces systemic risk: The stricken bank does not become a liquidity sink, and liquidity remains available to settle outstanding payments between healthy banks. Indeed, we show that the value of payment ‡ows between healthy banks remains virtually unchanged during an outage. Note: (**), (***) denote signi…cance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively 6 Appendix
Proof of the main proposition
The proof proceeds by backwards induction. Equilibrium play in the afternoon and evening is proven in section 6.2.
, there is an equilibrium in which no player pays in the morning (E1'), and another one in which payments are exchanged only if neither player is hit by an operational shock (E2'). Lemma 
The non-existence of other equilibria is simply given by assuming that the conditions hold for all opponent actions (all C j ).
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The following sections guide the reader through the proofs.
Equilibrium play in the afternoon and evening
In the afternoon, each player knows all his outstanding payment instructions and his available liquidity. There is no gain from hoarding liquidity but a positive cost because there is a risk that i will be unable to make the delayed payment in the evening. Priority is always given to the urgent payment because the cost of delay and the cost of technical default for the urgent instruction are higher than for the normal instruction (d > 0 and f u > f n ). Thus, in the afternoon, all available liquidity is used to execute outstanding payment instructions unless the player is hit by an operational shock. Normal instructions are only executed after urgent instructions have been executed. In the evening, all remaining instructions are executed subject to available liquidity unless the player is hit by an operational shock. If liquidity is insu¢ cient, and s E i = 0, an attempt is made to raise additional liquidity. Technical default -the failure to execute a payment on the day at which it is due -is, by assumption, su¢ ciently expensive for i to always attempt to raise additional liquidity if necessary. (Assuming that the attempt to raise additional liquidity succeeds with probability 1=2, this holds if
> f , which is implied by > f n ; f u .). 13 We have not investigated asymmetric equilibria. These may indeed exist. For su¢ ciently small likelihoods of operational shocks, d 00 The key result in this section is that if
Notice that d 00
. This is because there is an additional incentive to pay early when C j = 0: if i pays in the morning and j's returns this liquidity in the afternoon, i might be able to re-use this unit of liquidity in the evening.
It is instructive to have a closer look at d 00 L;i for the special case in which there is hardly any risk of operational failure (
Clearly, near-absence of operational shocks means that the incentive to make payments early is (nearly) lost when the opponent j has posted some collateral: j will use this liquidity if not in the morning, then in the afternoon period to make a payment; i can use this to make a second payment in the evening. Thus, for all d 0, i prefers to reserve the payment for the (possible) urgent payment instruction. In contrast, when C j = 0, there is a bene…t from paying in the morning: the opponent can then use this liquidity in the afternoon, and i can re-use it in the evening. If he receives an urgent payment instruction (probability v i ), i thus saves the need to attempt to raise additional collateral in the evening for the remaining normal instruction (which, if successful, costs , whereas the cost of failure is f n ).
f n , these costs are dominated by the cost of delaying the urgent payment, and i prefers to save his liquidity for the afternoon. Thus, d 00
su¢ cient to execute the urgent transaction immediately should it arrive. Thus, there is no bene…t from delaying the execution of the normal payment, but an expected cost, given that i might su¤er an operational outage in the subsequent periods. Now suppose that p 
The expression for u M i (0; 0; 0; 0) is straightforward: No payments can be made until period E, hence payo¤s only depend on whether additional liquidity can (second bracket) or cannot be raised (…rst bracket). u M i (1; 0; 0; 0) has already been derived in the previous section.
Suppose instead that C j = 1, and that p
= "
The derivation of these expressions is exactly analogous.
Consider u M i (0; 1; 0; 0) and u M i (0; 2; 0; 0). Because C j 1, j can choose to make a payment in period A; but i has no liquidity available before the start of period E. Then 
and at least the urgent payment can be made using incoming liquidity, so that the payo¤ is
Now consider the other payo¤s. We …rst consider the case s
Given s 
If s 
The expressions for u 
Now consider the expected payo¤ when C i 1. For C j 1,
2 and i's payo¤ is independent of j's behaviour in period A (and, of course, also in E). If s 
To see this, notice …rst that given p 
If, in contrast, the opponent pays in the morning (p
for C i ; C j 1. To see this, notice that l 
Intuitively, the result stems from the fact that i only su¤ers the delay cost when l 
The proof proceeds by solving u (8) and (16), we have
It is clear that this condition is ful…lled for su¢ ciently large d if " i and " j are not too large.
(1; C j ; 0; 1) for both C j 2 f1; 2g, as a straightforward comparison between equations (18) and (15) reveals. This gives rise to the following lemma: This result should be intuitive: if the costs of delaying the urgent payment are su¢ ciently high (and the instruction su¢ ciently likely to arrive), then i does not want to rely on incoming liquidity in the …rst round to …nance the urgent payment instruction. The proof …rst computes i's expected payo¤ u i (C i ; C j ) from posting C i units of collateral at the start of the day, given optimal play by both players in the subsequent rounds (see lemma 1). The expectation is over realisations of the operational shock s The proof …rst computes i's expected payo¤ u i (C i ; C j ) from posting C i units of collateral at the start of the day, given optimal play by both players in the subsequent rounds (see lemma 1). The expectation is over realisations of the operational shock s 
Regarding the …rst term, recall that C i = 2 costs 2 . Regarding the second, " i (1 " i ) ( v i d), notice that i su¤ers a delay cost d from the execution of the urgent transaction only if he obtains such a transaction (probability v i ), and if he is unable to execute it immediately in the afternoon (probability " i ) but able to execute it in the evening (probability (1 " i ) ). Correspondingly, he fails to execute the urgent transaction if he is hit by an operational outage in both the afternoon and the evening, resulting in an expected cost given by " 2 i v i f u . Finally, there is a chance that i is unable to execute the normal transaction if he is hit by three successive operational outages in the morning, afternoon and evening, resulting in a cost of " 3 i ( f n ). The proof for the other levels of C j proceeds correspondingly. Again, it is instructive to look at the special case of very unlikely operational outages (" i ; " j ! 0). Then
If there is hardly any risk of operational failure, there is no bene…t from posting two units of liquidity if C j 2 f1; 2g because i can rely on incoming funds in the morning and/or in the afternoon to make a second payment. In contrast, if the opponent posted no liquidity, p , and j will not be able to pay before the evening. Thus, if C i = 1, and i obtains an urgent payment instruction (probability v i ), then i has to attempt to raise an additional unit of liquidity in the evening. If > v i ( + f n ), the cost of posting this unit of collateral at the start of the day exceeds the expected costs of attempting to raise it in the evening (which fails with probability 1=2 such that i cannot execute the remaining normal payment and incurs a cost of f n ). An equivalent expression of this inequality is > f n v i = (2 v i ).
The reader will have noticed that L;i (C j ) is independent of d. This may, at …rst sight, be surprising, and is an important property: we state in our main proposition that C i = 1 is optimal for su¢ ciently high delay costs d (making posting more collateral more attractive), and su¢ ciently high costs of collateral (making posting less collateral more attractive), so it is important to show that these two conditions are independent to ensure that such (d; )
